ABSTRACT Honeypot technology can be applied to efficiently attract attackers and exhaust their resources. However, the traditional static honeypot is easy to be recognized by anti-honeypot technology. By contrast, most of the dynamic honeypots can simulate the real system in time, thus interacting with an intruder in disguise. In this paper, we employ the dynamic property of honeypot in four kinds of services of our system. However, this dynamic property shows up in a location and identification, indicating that genuine or fake services (honeypots) are changeable in different hosts. Thus, the dynamic property of our system differs from the dynamic honeypot aforementioned. Besides, we adopt the blockchain platform (Ethereum) to decentralize our system and store the port access data by delivering a private chain. To illustrate the effectiveness of our scheme in theory and practice, security analysis, eavesdropping attack, scanning attack, and DoS attack experiments are conducted. The results show that our scheme is valid in safeguarding against network attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a proactive defense mechanism, a honeypot is becoming an indispensable tool for providing network security in wide applications such as Internet of Things (IoT) [1] - [4] , wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [5] , [6] and vehicular networks [7] , etc. With proactivity and inveiglement, a honeypot can attract an attacker to interact with the fake system resources, which prevents valuable resources from being attacked. Generally speaking, honeypots are traps that imitate actual systems and monitor intruders in physical or virtual formalization. Compared with traditional methods, including but not restricted to Firewall and Intrusion Detection System (IDS), honeypots completely overthrow passiveness in network defense domain. Consequently, honeypots have gained widespread attention among cyber-security forces.
Honeypots can be classified into two categories in terms of variation attribute: static and dynamic honeypots. Static honeypots are designed to deceive attackers by imitating
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Marco Anisetti. some system characteristics. However, because of the fixed configuration and response, they are prone to be detected by attackers, who further escape the meaningless traps and launch an attack towards real system. The changeable property in dynamic honeypots improves the weakness of the former. Due to the changeable configuration, the pseudo system (i.e., dynamic honeypot [8] ) is capable of cheating intruders and of learning their attacking modes.
There are some typical works about dynamic honeypots. By integrating and analyzing data collected with passive and active tools, a dynamically configuration scheme [8] can be generated and implemented in Local Area Network (LAN) and enterprise network deployment. Both the real and fake systems simultaneously take effect during runtime. As described in [9] , the flow identified as legitimate or aggressive serves as measurement criteria for generating dynamic honeypots. According to the network load, the detail numerical result about honeypots and servers is derived. The result is carried out in actual deployment. Besides, a honeynet management framework [10] can be used to generate dynamic configuration approach. However, the dynamic property of these honeypot schemes is reflected in configuration and the location is still stationary. With the technology of anti-honeypot [11] , it is easy for attackers to recognize the fake resources and escape these traps to launch an attack on valuable resources.
In this paper, we concentrate on the dynamic property of honeypot locations, which means efficient translocation for real and fake system resources. The translocation among these resources should guarantee the exact positions are unpredictable. There are three major challenges:
• Centralization: For the translocation property, more than one host are adopted and an automation central mechanism is needed. The traditional method employs a central host for maintaining automation property. However, the central host in charge of change information may be out of order, which means that the whole system may breakdown.
• Confusability: The main goal of dynamic translocation mechanism is to hide the real resources. Due to the anti-honeypot technology, the fake or real resources are most likely to be recognized. The problem is, how could the system maintain its perplexity under the recognition technology of attackers?
• Forensics: The person who makes an attack always get away with murder. Therefore, the credible evidence of attack should be recorded for further investigation. It is necessary to record a compellent attack evidence for forensics. To solve the problem caused by centralization, in this paper, we propose a distributed and decentralized architecture and utilize blockchain [12] that features decentralization. Several hosts form a private blockchain and functional equivalence exists among these hosts. In this peer to peer (P2P) network, every host is likely to be a central controller. By cyclically voting in the next control host, the central controller keeps changing, which means that the system can maintain its normal operation under the worst circumstance of breakdown of a control host. In addition, the data in blockchain are tamper-resistant. Due to this attribute, any information stored in blockchain cannot be tampered with. Thus, we record the attacker's logs to the blockchain's blocks and these logs can be used for future forensics. Besides, we propose a new scheme to keep the intruder confusing. In our scheme, there are four kinds of services in every server host and each service features both the real and fake resources. The controller carries out a random role allocation algorithm to generate the changing information which specifies the real and fake services on different hosts. By changing services, the system makes a trap to capture the attacking traffic. A legal user can access the real services via synchronizing with (i.e., keeping pace with) the server hosts and any requests to the fake services are labeled as access violation. Even if the recognition technology exists, the changing property will perplex intruders and traps cannot be escaped as long as they keep the motivation of intruding a real service.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose a scheme to attract intruders and make them confused about the changeable dynamic services. In this scheme, every service is changing and it is almost impossible to locate any services.
• The blockchain is introduced for its decentralized and tamper-resistant properties. This distributed technology overcomes the shortcomings of centralization. By mining the potential block, the system can implement its decentralization to maintain normal operation. Therefore, it does not matter if a central host crashes in our system.
• We analyze the security of our scheme in Alloy and extensive experiments are conducted to verify effectiveness of our system. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we review the related existing solutions about honeypots and blockchain. System model is defined in Section III. Section IV illustrates the process of security analysis of our scheme in Alloy. The experiments are conducted in Section V and Section VI concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we will conduct the literature review on honeypot and blockchain.
A. HONEYPOT
A honeypot is designed to attract intruders for exhausting the attacking resources and for protecting the real system. There are some new application fields for this technology, such as wireless network [13] , social network [14] or industrial control network [15] , [16] . It can be used to defend against Denial of Service (DoS), Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), ransomware [17] , bandwidth attack [18] and so on. In terms of DoS attack, Anirudh [19] utilized honeypot for mitigating DoS in Internet of Things (IoT) devices. By comparing with logging library information, the system isolates abnormal requests in the honeypot trap and records the data of source of attack. For the DDoS attack, Anjali and Ramesh [9] proposed an auto-responsive honeypot architecture. Any suspicious traffic would be redirected to the isolated honeypot, further protecting the real system. Besides, it is worth mentioning that some honeypot schemes are dynamic. The dynamic property mainly reflects in configuration and deployment. Kuwatly [8] proposes a dynamic honeypot scheme and utilizes Nmap, P0f and Snort for active detection and passive fingerprint recognition. Honeyd and some highly interactive honeypots are used for network simulation and redirection of network flow respectively. The dynamic honeypot engine communicates with modules mentioned above, dynamically configuring Honeyd and providing configurable interface. Hassan et al. [20] dynamically adjusts honeypots to simulate the real industrial network in real time(i.e., the honeypot is a dummy of the real system) and allocates unused IP addresses to Honeyd cluster.
Saeedi et al. [21] studies dynamic honeypot management. According to the data collected from routers, firewalls, IDSs and honeypots, the configuration of honeypots is dynamically adjusted to adapt to the network environment. Fan et al. [22] combines a highly interactive honeypot with the low interactive one. An adaptive honeynet scheme is implemented by simulating some operating systems. The key module of this scheme is Honeybrid Gateway, which contains decision and redirection parts. The former is used to capture and transmit specific network traffic to Honeyd. The latter aims at redirecting Honeyd's flow to highly interactive honey field. The works mentioned above are about dynamic honeypot configuration scheme. There are some works about dynamic honeypot deployment. Hecher and Hay [23] proposes an automation honeypot deployment scheme. Active and passive network flow detection technologies are utilized for monitoring network. User's configuration information is stored in database, which can serve as a classification criterion for generating new honeynet, limiting bandwidth and targeting network IP range. A dynamic honeypot scheme Honeyvers based on machine learning is proposed by Fraunholz et al. [24] . Network environment is scanned and equipment is classified to determine exact number of honeypots, thus automatically generating configuration information and further deploying the honeypots. To solve the problem brought by non-uniform honeynet deployment, Fan et al. [10] puts forward a multi virtual honeynet management architecture, which generates specific honeynet information on the basis of different requests. The customized honeynet is automatically deployed by a tool set.
These dynamic honeypot schemes pretend to fit in network environment self-adaptively and focus on cheating intruders. However, the locations of these honeypots seem to be fixed once the configuration or deployment information is determined. With the development of anti-honeypot technology, all of these projects are likely to be distinguished.
Due to the location transformation property in our scheme, these dynamic configuration honeypots differ from ours. In our scheme, even if intruders detect the honeypot, they cannot locate the real services.
B. BLOCKCHAIN
Blockchain has gained wide attentions since bitcoin [25] , [26] was launched. Such a prevalent application features distribution, authentication, and synchronisation. The blockchain can maintain its normal function with no need for administration, in which every participant node can denote their processing power. Every authenticated transaction is recorded into blocks that constitute a blockchain. Each block has its own hash identifier and contains the previous one, thus forming a tamper-resistant sequence. The blockchain's network topology is P2P that mainly featured with distribution and decentralization [27] . The centralization of traditional application is confronted with system crashing once the center host suffers from attack. However, distribution characteristic means that blockchain is not for centralized management, which can avoid the aforementioned risk. Due to the decentralization property, every network node disperses the computation load and has better robustness. The P2P idea is adopted in truthful incentive mechanism [28] and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles [29] for electricity trading. Via the distribution property, a distributed platform for trading anonymous data set is proposed in [30] . A decentralized system is proposed in [31] , which focuses on personal data management [32] . The blockchain in [31] is utilized to monitor access requests and record data. Besides, there are some works related to blockchain's security [33] - [35] , such as block withholding attack [36] and 51% attack. Particularly, in [34] , the blockchain is utilized for Collaborative IDSs(CIDSs), which combine lots of monitors to generate an overall view of the monitored network. Such scheme improves the trust and consensus among monitors.
In this paper, we mainly utilize the decentralized and tamper-resistant characteristics of blockchain to maintain the normal function of our system and store attacking data for forensics.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present dynamic distributed honeypot [37] - [42] model that is formed by N hosts and four services. As shown in Fig. 1 . There are two participators: an illegal attacker and a legal user who is synchronized with the real service (i.e., the legal client is able to keep space with a real service and it knows the exact location). N hosts make up a private blockchain, which is a P2P network and do not open the door to the outside world.
A. BLOCKCHAIN
The Ethereum [43] (i.e., blockchain platform) serves as the bottom layer in system. N hosts constitute a private blockchain which forms a P2P network. By computing hash value of the block, the host in private chain is able to mine the potential block and upload it to the chain. This mechanism guarantees the deployment architecture to be distributed and decentralized. The temporal main host will execute the services allocation algorithm and send corresponding encrypted information to other hosts. As is shown in Fig. 2 , in our system, the block's miner H 0 (i.e., the host who successfully calculates a particular hash) becomes a main host at the period T 0 and another host H 1 may replace H 0 in the following circle. The host that has stronger computing power is more likely to be the temporal center controller. If the highly configured host suffers from attacks and its performance declines, it cannot serve as a center host for lacking enough computing power and other hosts will replace it automatically. Therefore, breakdown of the main host H 0 does not make a difference for the whole system (i.e., the system functions normally). The attack logs captured by one host are uploaded to blockchain and other nodes will synchronize these logs in our private chain. Thus, every node has the complete data, which are stored in a secure and tamper-resistant manner for future attack forensics. 
B. COMMUNICATION
As described in Section III-A, the host that mines a block acts as an impermanent centering controller. This center host generates conversion information that assigns every host to start different services (i.e., to start real or honeypot service) according to a random generation algorithm. The data contain service numbers and 01 encodings, which will be encrypted by RSA 2048-bit encryption algorithm. Then the encrypted data are sent to other hosts by a temporal center host in our private realm. After arriving at the corresponding host, the information is decrypted and the plain text is obtained. For 01 encodings, zero is a symbol of starting a honeypot service and one represents a real service. Via the text, a bit orient comparison is done, further starting the specified service to finish the execution procedure. For a legal user, synchronization is executed for maintaining normal function. By sending the encrypted information of a real service to the user, the server is able to provide a normal service. In addition, the user can send the encrypted data of 'whois + server name' request to actively gain the right address of specific service. Therefore, the valid user can access real system resources during the service usage.
Formal description of the decentralized communication mechanism in Fig. 3 
is derived and checked. There are a set of request mes- 
, the client connects to the new IP f . By periodically switching services, loop execution of the mentioned steps will be done.
C. SERVICES TRANSFORMATION
There are totally four kinds of services and each service has both the real and fake attributes (i.e., four real services and four corresponding honeypots) in our scheme. Periodic switching of services is executed every T period. The comparison of service allocation is demonstrated in Fig. 4 . Both kinds of services are constantly changing. Based on the premise of the existence of anti-honeypot identification technology, there are three kinds of meanings in defense:
• If a service S 0 in a host H 0 is real in T 0 , S 0 may become a fake one in next period T 1 . After transformation, the attacker cannot access the real service resources in T 1 .
• If a service S 1 in a host H 1 serves as a honeypot in T 0 , on the promise of anti-honeypot technology, once the attacker detects the service is a trap, it will escape S 1 , which may change to a real service in T 1 . Thus, this prevents the intruder accessing real resources.
• If a service S 0 in a host H 0 is real in T 0 , due to synchronization with valid users, the legal client will only send request to real service. Since there are some fake services (i.e., honeypots), any access traffic to the honeypots S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n in H 0 , H 1 , . . . , H m is tagged as attack log. Thus, transformation of services perplexes intruders and defends our system.
D. CLIENT-SIDE
The legal client creates two communication threads and opens the corresponding ports, thus serving as both the server and the client in communication process. Therefore, the client can receive the server's data and send requests to a server. There are two kinds of patterns for gaining real service information: positive pattern and passive pattern. For the positive pattern, the client actively sends 'whois + server name' requests to a server for a particular service IP address. However, in the passive pattern, the client only waits for the data from a server, which should read the clients list and send the right IP of all services to them. Besides, there are two key files (publicKey and privateKey) that contain 2048-bit data in client. The publicKey file is used to encrypt data before communication process and the privateKey file can decrypt encrypted data received from server-side. After getting the real service information, the client will automatically connect to the right IP and get real resources.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present security analysis about our system in Alloy [44] , [45] . As a formal specification language, Alloy can be used to express a system based on first order logic. Establishing an overview of system, setting theory and abstracting atoms and relations are implemented under an Alloy system model. System architecture is shown in Fig. 1 as aforementioned. Accordingly, system behavior is introduced and some related notations are depicted in Table 1 . The system will perform a set of atomic actions, i.e., Actions = {generate, send, receive, wait, open, close, recover, compromise}. These actions and their parameters are summarized in Table 2 . either a normal or a compromise mode at one point. A normal mode indicates that a host is operated without any malicious data and maintains its normal running. However, a compromise mode indicates that the host runs in a malicious way and causes damage to itself. The states regarding a running h i are divided into two categories: S N i for normal mode and S C i for compromise mode. The worst situation is that the host has broken down and stops running under a breakdown mode S B i . Therefore, States comprises three kinds of states {s n , s c , s b }. The host will run as its current mode until the transition → InterT occurs, which represents the transition relations between three different modes. Transitions shown in Fig. 5 can be defined as follows: Table 3 .
Since data transmitted among hosts guarantees normal operation of system, it plays an important role in security analysis. It is assumed that every piece of data is generated by only one host. data can be malicious and carries some commands that lead to malicious activities. A host that generates malicious data is regarded as compromised one. These predicates are described as followed:
A host h i with normal behaviors is in the normal mode normal(h i ) = compromised(h i ).
We assume that if a normal host receives malicious data, it will change to a compromise mode, further compromising itself. To prevent the compromised host intercepting data transmitted during communication, the communication channel should be secured:
The system is composed of h hosts as mentioned in Table 1 . All the states in these hosts illustrate overall state of the system, i.e., S system = S h 1 ∪S h 2 ∪. . .∪S h h . Each host's continuous legal behaviors (e.g., sending data via a channel) make the system function normally. Any hosts communicate with each other by sending and receiving data through communication channels: h i , send(c, data) → h j , receive(c, data) , indicating that sharing the same channel enables both to connect and to transmit the shared data. Only when they are connected via the same communication channel, data exchange can be carried out. Hence, we define the following predicate:
During the communication process, behaviors of h i and h j are shown in Fig. 6 . A host h i generates data and sends data to h j via a communication channel. After receiving the data from h i , h j can decide whether to accept or to discard these data. Once h j receives and accepts malicious data, it becomes compromised:
A normal host serves as a legal part of the system and makes the services of it function normally for users. As mentioned above, {compromise −→ normal} indicates a compromised host becomes a normal one in a recover In short, we abstract our system and focus on the data communication for the following attack analysis regarding security issues.
B. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY CHALLENGE AND SOLUTION
There have been many security challenges over the past few years. Attacks represent actions of using violence or something illegal to try to damage a system in network security. Defense technologies toward all kinds of attacks ensure system stability. In this subsection, we mainly analyze three kinds of attacks (i.e., eavesdropping attack, scanning attack and DoS attack) and relevant solutions to deal with these challenges.
1) EAVESDROPPING ATTACK
Eavesdropping attack is an illegal action of a third party to secretly obtain data that are transmitted between both sides of communication. To demonstrate this kind of attack, we take two hosts h 0 and h 1 into consideration. Both are connected via the same communication channel connected(h 0 , h 1 , c, States) and serve as normal hosts normal(h 0 ) ∧ normal(h 1 ). In an eavesdropping attack scenario, there exist a third host h attack and information interception occurs. When h 0 sends data to h 1 , h attack secretly obtains the transmitted data (i.e., connected(h 0 , h attack , c, States)), which ought to be sent to the only recipient h 1 . Such an attack can be described as follows:
It is inevitable that the communication data can be obtained by an illegal attacker. We should try to prevent the event of information disclosure. Therefore, encryption of data should be done to guarantee the security of communication channel. To protect against an eavesdropping attack between h 0 and h 1 , secured c for data is required, i.e., c in connected(h 0 , h 1 , c, States) should be secured:
Our system is encrypted by RSA 2048-bit encryption algorithm and it cannot be decoded without corresponding privacy key. Therefore, the communication channel is secured in our proposed system and further prevents eavesdropping attack.
2) SCANNING ATTACK
Scanning attack represents actions to send requests to all ports of a target host, aiming at exploring the opened ports and further exploiting their bug to launch attacks. Attackers usually utilize a scan tool to make a scanning attack. To demonstrate scanning attack, we assume that a host h 2 is scanned by h attack . First of all, h attack sends data request to all of the possible ports on the target host h 2 . Secondly, the opened ports will receive data request and reply to the source host h attack . Next, h attack receives these replies. Finally, h attack finds bugs of h 2 and launches attacks according to the opened ports. Such an attack can be described as follows:
To tackle problems brought by scanning attack, the scanned ports should be unpredictable for attackers. In order to maintain the unpredictability property, these ports are always changing. If the attacker scans the opened port p i and intends to attack the host h 2 with normal(h 2 ), the defender should close p i and open another one p j , which indicates the scanned information about ports loses its value. Actually, a service in h 2 has its own port number:
Consequently, to protect services from scanning attack, all ports need to be periodically closed and opened:
There are four services in our system, we periodically open or close them on different hosts to defense against scanning attack.
3) DOS ATTACK
DoS attack represents an attack pattern to send a large amount of requests to a target host. The host receives a temporary surge of requests and breakdown will occurs. An illegal host h attack generates lots of requests and sends them to a host h 3 with normal(h 3 ). After receiving these requests from h attack , h 3 will wait for their replies. There will be no any response from them, indicating a waste of system resources and further consuming the resources of h 3 until it is broken down. Such an attack can be described as follows:
. . .
[ The breakdown of h 3 results in single point of failure. To solve the problem, distributed scheme should be taken into consideration. Compared with traditional centralized host, distributed system can deal with the problem of single point of failure. A distributed system comprises h hosts and h >= 2. When h attack sends r requests, there exist two possible situations for the distributed system:
• DoS attack on one host. In such a case, breakdown of a host h 3 occurs:
can still provide services to users and maintain normal functions of the whole system, which avoids single point of failure.
• DoS attack on all hosts. In such a case, we assume r as the maximum of requests to make a host crash and each host shares the attack traffic. If h attack sends r requests, each host will receive r/h requests. h distributed hosts greatly reduce the illegal flow compared with one host, indicating hosts in the system will not crash. If a traditional system is faced with DoS attack, then
If a distributed system is faced with DoS attack, then
There are five distributed and decentralized hosts in our prototype system to effectively mitigate DoS attack.
In summary, we analyze three kinds of attacks and illustrate solutions to deal with these attacks. It is theoretically proved that our scheme can defense against these attacks. To verify the result, experiments are performed in Section V.
V. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our dynamic distributed honeypot defense scheme. The implementation of the prototype system is in Python, Java and Solidity (i.e., blockchain programming language). In addition, the experiments are conducted on five Linux personal computers (PC) with 4GB RAM for running services, one Linux PC with 16GB RAM for launching attack and one windows PC with 8G RAM for a legitimate user. Services (Mysql v5.7.23, Apache v2.4.18, Vsftpd v3.0.3 and Nginx v1.10.3) and Ethereum v1.8.10 (i.e., a blockchain platform used to form a private blockchain) are installed in five server hosts. The total numbers of real services in different hosts are calculated to illustrate their mean distributions. Three kinds of attack tests are conducted: eavesdropping attack, scanning attack and DoS attack.
A. MEAN DISTRIBUTION TESTING
Because of the transformation of services, attackers have no idea about the location of a real service. Nevertheless, they may try to find the host with a large proportion of real services. Therefore, the allocation algorithm is executed 70000 times for testing the distribution of real services. Since there are four kinds of services, there will be totally 280000 real services in our test. The exact numbers of four services in five hosts are shown in Fig. 7 . The proportions of different hosts are approximate to 20.8%, 19.6%, 17.6%, 22% and 20% in turn. Overall, the allocation is with equal probability. All of these percentage values are more than 17%, which indicates that the real services are likely to run on every host.
B. EAVESDROPPING ATTACK
Eavesdropping attack is conducted via Wireshark v2.6.2. As shown in Fig. 8 , the communication data between two servers are secretly obtained. As we mentioned above, the communication information is encrypted in RSA 2014-bit encryption algorithm. Even if an attacker acquires data transmitted during communication, it cannot get plaintext from the ciphertext, which illustrates that our scheme is effective in defending against eavesdropping attack.
C. SCANNING ATTACK TESTING
Scanning is an effective step for attackers to hunt the system bug. It is common that an attacker can obtain IP address of the target in advance. In this paper, we conduct the scanning attack testing via ZeNamp v7.01 (i.e., a scanning tool). Five server hosts mentioned above are scanned, which is shown in Fig. 9 .
We utilize the scanning command 'nmap -T4 -A -v 172. 18 Fig. 10 , we find that the ports 80 and 21 are opened. They represent Nginx and Vsftpd respectively. An attacker may launch server hacking at this point. However, we get the result that the ports are closed at the next time, which is illustrated in Fig. 11 . Since the detected services are closed, the attacker cannot gain any service resources. Even if the same port is opened, the intruder is likely to access a honeypot and gain the fake resources.
Due to the transformation property, the services are always changing. Even with a scanning tool, an attacker has no idea about the exact IP address of a service. Therefore, our scheme is effective in defending against the scanning attack.
D. DOS ATTACK TESTING
As we know, DoS attack aims at the wastage of PC resources, thus preventing a server from providing normal services and resources. We evaluate the network performance and response time of static hosts and dynamic servers (i.e., our proposed scheme) in SYN DoS attack. The attack testing is done via continuously sending the SYN packets with different rates.
1) NETWORK PERFORMANCE
To evaluate the network performance, the attack SYN packet size is set to 65495 bytes in Hping3 v3.0.0, which indicates that the packet is divided into certain TCP packets. The network performance measurement is carried out via Iperf v2.0.5.
Figs. 12-13 illustrate the impacts of the attacking rate on the network performance about the efficient TCP bandwidth and traffic. When attack rate is 0 (i.e., there is no attacking packet), both the two kinds of hosts reach their maximum values 653 (MBytes/sec) and 91.2 (Mbits/sec) in TCP bandwidth and TCP traffic respectively. However, with the increase of attack rate, there is a dramatic slowdown from 0 to 1000 packets per second. Apparently, the falling angle in static hosts is larger compared with the broken line of dynamic hosts. As we can see, there is a slow growth in the range from 1000 (packets/sec) to 3000 (packets/sec) and the value of dynamic hosts is still larger than that of static hosts. Thus, the dynamic distributed honeypot system has an advantage over the stationary hosts in terms of network performance.
2) RESPONSE TIME Trafgen in netsniff-ng v0.6.0 is used to launch a SYN attack test. Different from the SYN package mentioned in network performance evaluation, this kind of package consists of 64 bytes for SYN flood attack. Since there are four kinds of services in our system, the average response time of a service becomes an indispensable evaluation indicator. The response time measurement is performed by Jmeter v4.0 on every service.
The database query statement 'select * from school' is used for measuring the time of receiving corresponding data. As shown in Fig. 14 , the static host does not respond at 12.5 (Kbit/sec) attack rate. However, the response time of dynamic hosts seems to remain unchanged from 0 to 10 (Kbit/sec) on X-axis and it reaches the infinite value after 25 (Kbit/sec) along X-axis. The comparison with the dynamic hosts is striking, thus, the static host's Mysql server suffers from DoS attack. Since five distributed hosts share the attacking load, the experimental curve of dynamic hosts demonstrates their predominance on defending against DoS attack.
The time of loading the whole Apache web page is tested. At the beginning in Fig. 15 , dynamic hosts spend more time loading web page than a static host. This is because the blockchain's mining work exhausts some system resources, which becomes the key factor of influencing a server's response time. The time of a static host and that of dynamic hosts are almost the same with each other from 1 (Mbit/sec) to 10 (Mbit/sec), increasing slightly along X-axis. In such a case, both kinds of hosts are influenced under DoS attack. The static server does not response since 8 (Mbit/sec) and the dynamic server's response time is 3308 (ms) at the same attack rate, which indicates the dynamic Apache server can still response even if the static one crashes.
The curves of Vsftpd and Nginx in response time are shown in Figs. 16-17 . The response time of downloading a txt file from a Vsftpd server is measured under DoS attack. In Fig. 16 , the Vsftpd's response time in a static host is skyrocketing and reaches its infinity at 10 (Kbit/sec). Because of mining of blockchain, the overall trend from 0 to 10 (Kbit/sec) is slightly influenced. However, the flat trend of dynamic hosts' curve indicates resistance of DoS attack.
Since the mining work in dynamic hosts exhausts system resources, the Nginx is influenced. As illustrated in Fig. 17 , the Nginx average response time in a static host is superior to the dynamic one from 1 to 2.5 (Mbit/sec) along X-axis. After 2.5 (Mbit/sec), DoS attack becomes a main factor to affect response time. From 3 (Mbit/sec) to 6 (Mbit/sec), the curve of dynamic hosts is always bellow the other, which means the time in a static host is longer than in dynamic hosts. It is learned that Nginx makes characters of smaller memory and high concurrency, therefore both curves maintain their gentle characteristic. However, the static server's downtime is earlier than the dynamic one, which indicates the effectiveness of our scheme.
3) DEFENSE ANALYSIS
To better illustrate defense ability of our scheme, the response times of four services with no any attack are summarized in Table 5 . The times in a static host are always less than that of the dynamic one. Even if the difficulty value in genesis file is adjusted to '0x400' for reduction of computational overhead, the consensus mechanism for block generation makes dynamic services less efficient in response time. Nonetheless, the ultimate attack speeds of dynamic hosts that make a service crash show an advantage over the static host, as shown in Table 6 . With no attack traffic, the poor efficiency in dynamic hosts leads to longer response time. However, with attack traffic increasing, attack mitigation in dynamic hosts shows their advantages in system protection, which indicates effectiveness of our proposed scheme.
4) COMPARISON
To compare our scheme with other techniques proposed for dynamic blockchain, three dynamic works related to blockchain are presented. Blockchain is used for dynamic keys management in [27] , where the third-party authorities are removed and the functions of a central manager are merged into security manager network. Based on blockchain, verification protocol for dynamic spectrum access is proposed in [46] and a central authority node is removed. The blockchain is mainly utilized for recording transactions. In [47] , blockchain is adopted to a dynamic distributed access control scheme for IoT authenticated devices and access permission is stored in the blockchain network. Dynamic policy is generated using a smart contract for the IoT device that is registered without associate policies. These works mainly utilize the unalterable, distributed and decentralized nature of blockchain, which is similar to our scheme.
Comparison with other related works is shown in Table 4 . All these dynamic schemes are equipped with multi-honeypots. However, their distributed architectures are controlled by a center party, which does not confirm to the decentralization property. The problem of centralization leads to single point of failure, further making the whole system crash. Besides, data stored in these database are alterable under an unsafe condition. By contract, our scheme is decentralized and unalterable based on blockchain. Dynamic information of these schemes are reflected in deployment or configuration. However, the information is only about honeypots rather than a real system. Once these honeypots are recognized, the fixed real system is faced with a threat of being attacked. Therefore, dynamic objects of our scheme contain both the honeypots and the real services. By periodically changing real services, an attacker cannot find them, thus protecting the system. Above all, the comparison shows advantages of our scheme.
Summary: All the experimental results show that the proposed dynamic honeypot system outperforms the traditional fixed service. Since blockchain consumes system resource, the experimental data are slightly influenced in dynamic hosts. Nevertheless, our scheme reduces the attacking load in contrast to the traditional fixed service. Via the performance evaluation above, we can claim that the overall response time and network performance of our scheme have advantages over the traditional scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we made the first effort to investigate the dynamic distributed honeypot system. Every real service and honeypot is changing among distributed hosts to perplex intruders. We firstly introduced our scheme that consists of private blockchain, encrypted communication and services transformation. Then, we theoretically analyzed the security of our scheme in Alloy language, and the results show its defense capability. We finally conducted distribution test of real services, eavesdropping attack, scanning attack and SYN DoS attack to verify the system prototype.
